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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAURINE ELG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
BOYD FITZGERALD and VALLEY 
VIEW RIDING STABLES, 
Defendants an.d Respondents 
Case No 
14169 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
MATERIAL NOT PART OF THE RECORD MAY BE RELIED UPON 
AS A REASON FOR REMOVAL. 
Counsel for defendant-respondent asserts that in his 
opinion "it is totally improper to set forth matters which are 
held in chambers without a court reporter.11 In the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: 
"Material which is not part of the 
record may be relied upon by the Supreme 
Court as a reason for remand." Giles v. 
Maryland, 386 U. S. 66, 17 L. Ed. 2d 737, 
87 S. Ct. 793. 
The author of Appeal and Error in 4 Am. Jur. 2d §487, under the 
heading "Contradiction of Explanation by Matter Dehors Record,1' 
noted that: 
11
 . . . evidence (such as statements by 
the trial judge) can be received which 
does not contradict the record, but explains 
it." 
Thus, the opinion of counsel for the defendant-respondent is con-
trary to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court. 
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Appellant, in her Brief, attempted to advise the 
Supreme Court of the statements of the trial judge in chambers 
prior to trial and Appellant submits that such evidence can 
be received as long as "it does not contradict the record, but 
explains it.ff In her Brief, Appellant argues that the trial 
judge told Appellant's counsel that he would not apply the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to this case because he did not 
believe it was still the law in the State of Utah. To the 
contrary, Respondent argues that the trial judge inquired as 
to whether Appellant intended to rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur and that counsel for Appellant advised the court 
that he did not. Now, which position ndoes not contradict 
the record, but explains it11? 
The record reveals that counsel for Respondent argued 
in his Motion to Dismiss as follows; 
"We admit it was an unfortunate accident, 
but res ipsa doesn't apply in this instance. 
The plaintiff has proved nothing except res 
ipsa." (Emphasis added) (Tr. 163: 16-18) 
Now where did counsel for Respondent get the idea 
that "res ipsa didn't apply to this case?" The answer is 
obvious. He was merely paraphrasing the statement of the trial 
judge in chambers that he would not apply res ipsa to this case. 
POINT II 
THE COMPLAINT IS SUFFICIENT TO APPRISE RESPONDENT 
OF APPELLANT'S INTENTION TO RELY ON THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR. 
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Next, Respondent argues that Appellant did not 
plead res ipsa loquitur in her Complaint and did not make 
specific her request that the doctrine be considered at the time 
of trial. Respondent cites Joseph v. W. H. Groves1 Latter Day 
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P. 2d 935 as follows: 
"We think one who wishes to rely on that 
doctrine, as well as specifically assigned 
acts of negligence, must so plead, either 
by separate count or proper allegation to 
the effect that the negligence to be in-
ferred from the general situation caused 
the injury, thereby notifying the other 
party that he intends to rely on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." (Emphasis 
added) 
The above citation does not appear in the Joseph 
case. That counsel for Respondent would attempt to argue a 
citation which does not appear in the case cited is either 
unethical or very sloppy work. Nevertheless, even the language 
cited by Respondent's counsel, wherever it came from, provides 
that a plaintiff may satisfy the pleading requirement by a 
proper allegation "to the effect that the negligence to be 
inferred from the general situation caused the injury" and such 
an allegation is adequate notification to the other party that the 
plaintiff intends to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
In plaintifffs Complaint the following allegation 
was made: 
"On or about October 6, 1973 at approx-
imately 8:00 o'clock p.m., defendant 
Boyd F. Fitzgerald and defendant Valley 
View Riding Stables by and through one 
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of their agents, employees or servants 
negligently allowed approximately 29 
people to board a haywagon which was 
unsafe and in poor condition and there-
after negligently drove said haywagon 
in such a manner as to cause almost all 
of the people on said wagon to be thrown 
off of the wagon to the ground." 
In light of the general policy to allow pleadings to 
allege facts and not specific, technical causes of action, the 
Complaint filed herein contains sufficient indications of 
reliance on the situation as well as specific acts of the defen-
dants and the plaintiff is not precluded from relying on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in addition to specific acts of 
negligence alleged. The purpose of such general or situational 
allegations is to place the defendant on notice of the plaintifffs 
intention to so rely on res ipsa. In this case, not only do the 
pleadings allege that defendant was negligent in allowing 29 
people to become involved in such a dangerous situation, but 
counsel for the plaintiff also made it perfectly clear in chambers 
and in every other way possible that it was his intention to rely 
upon the doctrine of res ipsa in addition to specific acts of 
negligence, such as the driving of defendant's agent, or the main-
tenance of the vehicle by the defendant or his agents, etc. 
The notice aspect of pleadings has been enunciated in 
this court in Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 99 Ut. 496, 
108 P. 254, where pleadings were required to "put the defen-
dant on notice that the plaintiff is going to rely on the situ-
ation itself to furnish any inference or negligence." Loos, 
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supra, at 259. Loos was later explained by this court in Capitol 
Electric Co. v. Campbell, 217 P. 2d 392, at 396-397, where the 
court said: 
"In the case of Loos v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P. 254, 
we allowed a recasting of the plead-
ings to make more certain the issue of 
res ipsa loquitur. But in that case, 
we reversed the judgment because of 
error in. instructing on the issues 
raised by allegations of specific negli-
gence and refusal to instruct on the 
issue of res ipsa loquitur when there 
was no evidence to support such allega-
tions of specific negligence, but there 
was evidence to support the issue of res 
ipsa loquitur. In short, when we 
reversed for error, we permitted a new 
trial and allowed amendments." 
This shows the serious nature of refusal to recognize res ipsa 
by the trial court, and the Supreme Court's willingness to constru( 
pleadings liberally. 
Once the evidence supports submission under the general 
res ipsa doctrine, the court should consider it (assuming some 
notice has been timely given to the defendant). This position 
has been taken by this court in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter 
Day Saints Hospital, supra, where the issue was the trial court's 
refusal to include res ipsa. The court stated: 
11
 . . . under proper circumstances neither 
the failure to expressly plead res ipsa 
loquitur, nor the fact that specific acts 
of negligence are proved, would preclude 
the submission of the case on that doc-
trine, [now] we proceed to consider the 
most fundamental proposition: Whether the 
evidence here would have justified submis-
sion of the case upon that theory." 
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The face of the pleading contains a general allegation 
of negligence attributable to the situation (hay ride) in para-
graph 4, which states: 
n
 . . . defendant . . . negligently 
allowed approximately 29 people to 
board a haywagon which was unsafe 
i« 
The specific acts alleged were also in this paragraph: 
11
 . . . and thereafter negligently 
drive said haywagon in such a manner 
as to cause almost all of the people 
on said wagon to be thrown off of the 
wagon to the ground.11 
POINT III 
ONCE APPELLANT HAS ESTABLISHED A CASE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR, THE BURDEN IS CAST UPON THE RESPONDENT TO MAKE PROOF 
OF WHAT HAPPENED. 
Counsel for Respondent also states that Tlnowhere can 
this writer (counsel for Respondent) find any law which states 
that the burden of proof shifts, as Appellant has alleged." In 
Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 351 P. 2d 952, 10 Ut. 2d 276 
(1960), the Utah Supreme Court answered this charge as follows: 
"This argument practically ignores 
the purpose of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, namely, to permit one 
who suffers injury from something 
under the control of another, which 
ordinarily would not cause the injury 
except for the other's negligence, to 
present his grievance to a court or 
jury on the basis of the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from such facts; 
and cast the burden upon the other to 
make proof of what happened.11 (Emphasis 
added) 
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POINT IV 
RESPONDENT HAD CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AND WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALITY (HAYWAGON) WHICH CAUSED 
THE APPELLANT'S INJURY. 
Finally, Respondent argues that nthe only logical explana-
tion of any witness" as to what caused the accident was that of 
Eva Gains, whose explanation was ,fthat the guitar player fell and 
caused the railing to break.11 
It is submitted again that if the haywagon was so unstable 
that if one man lost his balance and fell that it would cause 
everyone else to fall off of the haywagon that the Respondent 
was negligent in inviting people to use his haywagon for a hay-
ride when it was not safe to be used for such a purpose. It is 
also submitted that if there was some danger in allowing the man 
to stand that the driver of the haywagon, who was sitting almost 
next to the man, had a duty to warn him of the instability of 
the haywagon and the reasonable consequences of what might fore-
seeably happen if he fell. No such warning was given. (Tr. 193: 
14-29) 
In regard to the necessary "control over the instrumen-
tality which caused the injury," the Utah Supreme Court in 
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 302 P. 2d 471, 5 Ut. 2d 
373 (1956), has made the following observations: 
11
 . . . it would seem more accurate 
to appraise the situation in terms of 
the defendants1 responsibility for the 
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instrumentality, its condition or 
function, rather than merely its 
control . . . ." 
In the subject case, the Defendant-Respondent had a 
"responsibility11 to provide a haywagon for the hayride to paying 
customers that was in good "condition11 and would "function" in 
such a way that in the normal course of events which were likely 
to be encountered on a typical hayride and would not result in 
dumping some 29 passengers into the roadway causing serious 
injury to the Plaintiff-Appellant. The Respondent had "control" 
over the haywagon, that the accident occurred without any parti-
cipation of the Appellant or other riders and it was the kind of 
accident which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had due care been observed by Respondent. Under such 
facts and proof, the Appellant should be entitled to a recovery 
for the serious injuries she suffered. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
district court should be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN, SCALLEY, LUNT & KIMBLE 
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